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Abstract A bi-level account of trust is developed and defended, one with relevance
in ethics as well as epistemology. The proposed account of trust—on which trusting
is modelled within a virtue-theoretic framework as a performance-type with an
aim—distinguishes between two distinct levels of trust, apt and convictive, that take
us beyond previous assessments of its nature, value, and relationship to risk
assessment. While Sosa (A virtue epistemology: apt belief and reflective knowl-
edge, volume I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; Judgment and agency,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015; Epistemology, University Press, Princeton,
2017), in particular, has shown how a performance normativity model may be
fruitfully applied to belief, my objective is to apply this kind of model in a novel and
principled way to trust. I conclude by outlining some of the key advantages of the
performance-theoretic bi-level account of trust defended over more traditional
univocal proposals.
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1.
A helpful—and thus far, unexplored—way to think about trust will be to draw from
the resources of virtue epistemology, and in particular, from the bi-level virtue
epistemology framework developed by Ernest Sosa (2009, 2015, 2017).
Sosa’s distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge (a
distinction around which his epistemological project is centred) is
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controversial.1 Nonetheless, his sophisticated framework for modelling the
normative structure of performances with aims will be useful—regardless of
what we say about knowledge—for theorising about two very distinctive levels of
trust, levels that take us beyond previous assessments of its nature, value and
relationship to risk assessment.
The bi-level account of trust I aim to propose is one in which the notion of
competence plays a starring role. One may initially wonder why competence should
play any role in an account of trust (as opposed to trustworthiness2)? Competences,
after all, are dispositions, but trust is paradigmatically an attitude or a hybrid of
attitudes (e.g., optimism, hope, belief, etc.), one that involves actual, and not merely
dispositional, vulnerability to betrayal.
In what follows, I’ll focus (i) first on a simple auxiliary role for competence to
play in an account of trust, and then (ii) on some more sophisticated constitutive
roles. What results will be a novel performance-theoretic account of the structure of
trust, one that will have applications in both ethics and epistemology as well as
advantages over more traditional accounts in both areas.
2.
Beliefs aim at truth.3 Sometimes, beliefs hit that aim through dumb luck. Such
beliefs, while valuable to the extent that truth is valuable, are regarded as less
valuable, less epistemologically praiseworthy, as knowledge—viz., what you get
when belief hits its aim (truth) through cognitive skill. This is an idea that lies at the
heart of contemporary virtue epistemology.
Does trust aim at anything? If it does, then a tempting line of thought goes as
follows: when trust hits its aim—whatever that is—that is good to the extent that
trust’s aim is a worthy aim.4 But, when trust hits its aim skilfully, that is something
even better.
1 See, for example, Kornblith (2009, 2010, 2012) for some notable criticisms of Sosa’s animal/reflective
knowledge distinction. Cf., Perrine (2014) and Carter and McKenna (2018).
2 For a view of trustworthiness as a kind of disposition, see Potter (2002) and Hardin (1996). For
criticism, see Jones (2012).
3 This idea is, at any rate, commonplace in epistemology—viz., the idea that truth is the standard of
correctness for belief; a belief is correct if and only if true. A stronger, but more controversial, way of
articulating this idea is embraced by normativists about belief, e.g., Shah and Velleman (2005) and Shah
(2003). According to this view, belief constitutively aims at truth; what distinguishes an attitude as a
belief is that it is governed by the truth norm in this way. Note that the ground-level idea that belief aims
at truth needn’t commit one to the stronger view held by normativists. For representative work on the
topic, see Chan (2013). Note, finally, that some epistemologists maintain that belief aims not at truth, but
at knowledge; this is the position embraced by proponents of the knowledge-first program e.g.,
Williamson (2000). I am for the present purposes setting this point aside.
4 Some forms of trust may be morally bad. As Baier (1986, 232) notes, ‘There are immoral as well as
moral trust relationships, and trustbusting can be a morally proper goal’. Likewise, Kvanvig (2008) notes
that some truths can be morally bad to possess, or for that matter pointless. The proposal developed here
(like an account of knowledge, in epistemology) is compatible with this much; it may be that, on some
occasions, moral and other values render a particular case of trusting all-things-considered disvaluable,
just as knowledge may on occasion be all-things-considered disvaluable.
J. A. Carter
123
Plausibly, trust does have an aim, much like belief does. Even among those who
disagree about the nature of trust, it is generally agreed that trust is an attitude we
have towards people whom we hope will (in some suitably specified way) take care
of things as we have entrusted them,5 where the entrusting itself involves incurring
some non-negligible level of risk.6
There is much discussion about what it would be for the trustee to take care of
things as entrusted—viz., what additional attitudes and/or beliefs7 this may involve,
including attitudes and beliefs about the attitudes (e.g., goodwill) and beliefs of the
trustee.8 However these details are filled out, it remains that when one trusts another
to take care of things as entrusted, there is a clear sense in which the trust succeeds
only when the trustee actually does take care of things as they are entrusted
(perhaps, compresently, with certain attitudes or beliefs).
I want to accordingly take as a starting point a distinction between (i) trust as a
success-apt attitude and (ii) successful trust, as follows:
Trust attitude (Trust-A): an attitude we have towards people whom we hope
will take care of things as we have entrusted them,9 and which involves
incurring some non-negligible level of risk.
Successful trust: when one’s Trust-A in another is fulfilled—viz., when
another has taken care of things as we have entrusted them.
3.
Just as one can fail to be trustworthy, one can fail to trust well, by trusting (and
incurring some risk of betrayal) in ways that don’t ordinary lead to successful trust.
5 See, for example, Baier (1986, 235) and Jones (1996). Note that the term ‘‘trust’’ also has an impersonal
use; for example, one might trust the rope they are climbing or their car’s breaks. The kind of trust of
interest in this paper is interpersonal trust. For discussion of the distinction between trust and mere
reliance, see §11(e).
6 For a helpful overview of this common ground, as well as points of contentions, see Simon (2013) and
McLeod (2015).
7 According to cognitive accounts of trust, trusting is a species of belief. See, for example, Gambetta
(1988) and Coleman (1990). Doxastic accounts maintain similarly that trust entails or involves a belief to
the effect that the trustee will be trustworthy.
8 This may also involve entrusting them to take care of things out of goodwill e.g., Baier (1986, 234). On
Baier’s view, ‘Where one depends on another’s good will, one is necessarily vulnerable to the limits of
that good will’, and accordingly, to risk. The role of goodwill more generally in an account of trust is
controversial. As Holton (1994, 65) notes: ‘For instance, I can trust someone to take care of a third party
or to themselves, without requiring that they have goodwill towards me.’ Moreover, it might also involve
further beliefs: as Hawley (2014, 10) puts it: ‘To trust someone to do something is to believe that she has
a commitment to doing it and to rely upon her to meet that commitment’. The ground-level idea that trust
requires some kind of optimistic attitude is important in order to have a notion of trust that doesn’t
collapse into mere reliance. More will be said on this issue in §11. Thanks to Mona Simion for discussion
on this point.
9 See, for example, Baier (1986) and Jones (1996).
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For example, one might be overly naive or overly cynical with respect to others’
intentions or abilities.10 In the former case, one fails to trust well if one (for
instance), overestimates others’ goodwill, or if one too easily perceives bad will
when it is not present. In the latter case, one fails to trust well if (for instance) one,
overly jaded, too easily perceives others as incapable of taking care of things that
they would have easily done.
Likewise, one might have (i) a distorted introspection of personal risk; or (ii) a
distorted perception of gains of betrayal to trustee. In the former case, one fails to
trust well if one (for instance) fails to appreciate what is at stake for oneself—viz.,
the costs to oneself of betrayal by the trustee, regardless of what the trustee stands
to gain through betrayal. In the latter case, one fails to trust well if one (for instance)
fails to appreciate the extent to which the trustee would benefit by betraying,
regardless of the costs to the truster of betrayal.11
4.
Successful trust is compatible with failing to trust well. One might, by exhibiting
any of the above (or other) defects in trusting—trust in a way that easily would not
lead to successful trust, but which does anyhow on a particular occasion.
That you can trust badly and still trust successfully is analogous to what happens
in other domains of performance.12 Even the poorest chess player’s strategy might
on occasion win a game.
If trusting well were entailed by trusting successfully, there would be no obvious
need for an account of what it is to trust competently. But it is not. And accordingly,
to the extent that we value trusting well and not just trusting successfully, we need
to be able to say what trusting well involves.
Here an analogy to the value of knowledge literature is helpful: epistemologists
care about more than mere true (i.e., successful) belief; unsurprisingly, the value of
knowledge (roughly: a belief whose correctness is in some way through ability13) is
widely taken to exceed the value of mere true belief. Not implausibly, there is a
10 A point emphasised by Nietzsche, cited also in Baier (1986, 246) is that the power to have one’s
promises accepted isn’t a power that is possessed equally by everyone in relation to everyone else; it is
oftentimes possessed only by those with a certain social status and can (in such structures) be a de facto
privilege of the elite. In the present context, an appreciation of this point is instructive in that it indicates
how certain social structures may themselves have a deleterious effect on the preconditions for trusting
well—a point wielded famously in the service of a political conclusion by Hobbes. For a recent and
helpful discussion on the moral and epistemic features of communities of trust, see Alfano (2016).
11 Perhaps, trustors should also expect the very act of trusting will affect trustees in certain ways; if this is
the case, then a bad trustor would be insensitive to such influences. For discussion of such a view, see
Faulkner (2011).
12 See Sosa (2009, 31).
13 This is, at least, a common template proposal for analysing knowledge accepted by most contemporary
virtue epistemologists. See, along with Sosa, Greco (2003, 2010), Turri (2011) and Zagzebski (1996).
Two of the principal challenges to the material adequacy of this template formula in the recent literature
concern environmental epistemic luck and testimony. For discussion, see Pritchard (2012) and Lackey
(2007).
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species of trust the value of which is greater than merely successful trust. If the
value of knowledge debate is any guide,14 we’ll locate such a value by first looking
at (i) what trusting well, viz., trusting competently, involves, and then to (ii)
successful trust that is connected to competent trusting in the right kind of way.
5.
A competence is, in short, a disposition to perform well in a given domain.15 What
counts as performing well, or reliably enough, depends on the domain of
performance.16 A baseball-hitting competence may require just that one hit the
ball safely about 30% of the times one tries. Though a competence to ride a bike
may demand a greater degree of reliability—viz., falling off the bike more than 50%
of the time one tries (in normal conditions) betrays a lack of a competence to ride a
bike.
On Sosa’s view, competences have a ‘triple-S’ constitution—seat, shape and
situation—with reference to which three kinds of dispositions can be distinguished:
the innermost competence (seat), the inner competence (seat ? shape), and the
complete competence (seat ? shape ? situation).
To bring this idea into sharp relief, just consider the illustrative example Sosa
offers concerning one’s (complete) competence to drive a car:
With regard to one’s competence in driving, for example, we can distinguish
between (a) the innermost driving competence that is seated in one’s brain,
nervous system, and body, which one retains even while asleep or drunk; (b) a
fuller inner competence, which requires also that one be in proper shape, that
is, awake, sober, alert, and so on; and (c) complete competence or ability to
drive well and safely (on a given road or in a certain area), which requires also
that one be well situated, with appropriate road conditions pertaining to the
surface, the lighting, etc. The complete competence is thus an SSS (or an
SeShSi) competence (2017, 191–92).
The idea that one can retain one’s innermost competence to drive a car even while
drunk or on slick roads comports well with the familiar idea—defended variously by
Tony Honore´ (1964), Anthony Kenny (1976) and Mele (2003, 447–70)—that one
can retain a general ability to do something, /, even when one lacks a specific
ability to /.
Consider, for example, a competent prosecutor, Akira, who is alert and in
possession of the defendant’s deposition (and other relevant legal documents),
14 See, for example, Kvanvig (2003), Haddock et al. (2010), and Pritchard (2011). For an overview, see
Pritchard et al. (2018).
15 For what is perhaps Sosa’s clearest exposition of this idea, see Sosa (2010).
16 As Sosa (2015, 73) remarks ‘What sets such a threshold? This will vary from domain to domain. It
may be conventional and formalized, as in some professional contexts, or it may be less formal, more
intuitive, as in the domain of a hunt. In each case, the threshold will be set by considerations distinctive of
the domain and the proper basic aims of performances in it’.
On behalf of a bi-level account of trust
123
standing in a courtroom. If we assume further that the evidence in Akira’s
possession sufficiently implicates the defendant, there is nothing standing between
Akira and a successful prosecution. In such a circumstance, as John Maier (2018,
§1.3) puts it, every prerequisite for Akira’s successfully prosecuting the defendant is
met. In such a case, Akira has the specific ability to prosecute the defendant. But
now imagine an internally identical lawyer—Akira*—who is just like Akira in all
respects, except that Akira* has been drugged and deprived of the defendant’s
deposition and is locked in the courthouse basement. Akira* lacks the specific
ability to prosecute the defendant—she is certain to fail if she tried—though she
retains the general ability to do so17; she is, after all, very different from the
hopeless Zakira, who, suppose, is also drugged and deprived of the defendant’s
deposition and locked in the basement, but who (if not drugged, and equipped with
all relevant documents, and situated in the courtroom in front of the judge) would,
unlike Akira*, have no clue as to how to legally proceed, and so would fail to
successfully prosecute the defendant.
How might we test for a general ability? What the foregoing suggests is that we
should not ask whether one would succeed simpliciter, if they tried, but rather, if
they would succeed if they tried while in conditions appropriate to the relevant
performance-type.
Sosa’s own view offers a clear and helpful way to model this idea: according to
Sosa, we test for an innermost competence with trigger-manifestation condition-
als18; we ask, of the individual: would they perform reliably enough if they tried
(i) in proper shape and (ii) properly situated? where what counts as ‘proper’ shape
and situation is relative to the domain of performance.19 Because our competence-
discerning judgments need to keep track of who would perform well in situations
where (as Sosa puts it) ‘human accomplishment is prized (or otherwise of special
interest),’20 it is our own human interests and needs that—as we should expect—
play a role in fixing the limits of proper shape and proper situation that circumscribe
a given competence-type.21
17 This is a modification of an example from Maier (2018, §1.3).
18 Sosa (2010, 466).
19 Consider, for example, that we don’t test for one’s driving competence by asking: would the driver
perform reliably enough (make it to the destination safely, avoid accidents, etc.) if deprived of oxygen
and placed on abnormally slick roads; driving poorly in those conditions doesn’t count against one’s
possessing a competence to drive reliably enough when in proper shape and properly situated—viz., in
normal driving conditions. The same goes for more mundane competences, like visual-perceptual
competences: one possesses the (innermost) visual-perceptual competence if one’s visual-perceptual
beliefs are reliably enough correct when one is in proper shape (i.e., awake, alert) and properly situated
(not in the dark, in thick fog, etc.).
20 Sosa (2017, 205; 2010, 466.).
21 For further discussion, see Sosa (2010, Sects. 1–3 and 2017, 205).
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6.
What would it take, then, to have an (innermost) competence to specifically trust
well? To a first approximation, a promising answer will take the following form:
Trust Competence (Trust-C): A competence to Trust-A successfully reliably
enough, when in proper shape and properly situated.
What is it to be in proper shape and properly situated, vis-a`-vis trusting; in what
circumstances is trusting well of special human interest? Consider, by way of a
comparison, how this question might be approached in the case of other
dispositions: (a) the flammability of a match22 and (b) an archery competence. In
each case, the relevant trigger-manifestation conditional corresponds with shape and
situational parameters that track the conditions under which the relevant success
(viz., hitting the aim) is of primary interest to us.
Trigger-manifestation
conditional
Shape Situation
Flammability of
a match
If it were struck it would
likely light
Dry Plenty of oxygen
Archery
competence
If you shoot, you’d likely hit Awake,
sober, alert
Plenty of light,
low winds
Trust
competence
If you trust, you’d likely trust
successfully
? ?
Consider first the shape relevant to Trust-C. Presumably, this will involve at least
certain healthy levels cognitive functioning (e.g., the sort relevant to risk
assessment) which preclude various kinds of mental incapacitation.
Moreover, it’s plausible that one is not in proper shape to trust if one is the
subject of some form of ex ante manipulation or coercion. Here a distinction is
needed between (i) manipulation ex ante into trusting (e.g., as when one is tricked
into trusting23); and (ii) manipulation post hoc by the trustee. One may be in proper
shape to trust competently even if one’s trustee ultimately happens to betray one’s
trust—viz., manipulation post hoc.24
However, just as we don’t test for a driving competence by checking one’s
reliability in conditions where (for instance) one is misled about the correct speed
limit—for example, if pranksters swapped out a 20 mph sign for a 50 mph sign—
22 See Sosa (2010, 465–466).
23 For instance, suppose you are duped into trusting the medical advice of someone who presents as a
doctor, but under conditions in which this deception would be undetectable even by the most cautious.
24 This is just a corollary of the more general idea that a performance’s being competent does not entail
that it is successful. Compare: Even when every prerequisite is in place for a basketball player’s making a
free-throw, the shooter may still miss on occasion, despite attempting a competent shot. A shooter’s
competence, after all, is (as noted in §5) a competence to hit the target reliably enough via one’s method
exercised in proper shape and when properly situated. Whereas, in baseball, such a method need only be
30% reliable to qualify as a competence, an archery competence may require a more reliable method,
though not an infallible method. For discussion see Carter et al. (2015) and Carter (2019).
On behalf of a bi-level account of trust
123
nor, in the case of a competence to trust well, do we check whether one performs
reliably enough in conditions in which (for instance) one is manipulated into
trusting, as when one is the subject of an elaborate prank or deception (i.e., a
surprise party). These are abnormal circumstances, not the circumstances in which
we generally value the accomplishment of trusting well.
Moreover, just as we don’t test whether one is a competent truster by asking
whether they trust successfully reliably enough when drugged, coerced or
manipulated ex ante (i.e., in improper shape), nor do we do so in situations where
normal bounds of risk, effort and skill are not present. In a bit more detail: it doesn’t
count against someone’s having a competence to trust well if the truster would not
trust-A successfully reliably enough in conditions where the (a) risk to the truster is
excessively high and gains of betrayal are enormous25; or where the level of
(b) effort or (c) skill that would be required by the trustee to take care of things as
entrusted is abnormally high.26
The foregoing then suggests we fill out the above table in the following way. We
test for a trust competence by asking: would the truster trust successfully reliably
enough when in normal mental shape and not manipulated ex ante into trusting (i.e.,
in proper shape), and in a trust situation within normal bounds of risk, effort and
skill (i.e., when properly situated).27
7.
Consider now the following case:
Gettier trust: Inspector Pazzi is attempting to catch an art thief, and to do so,
he relies on a museum curator, Dr. Fell, whom Pazzi knows has always been
trustworthy (unlike some of the potential experts he could have relied on), to
assist him. Dr. Fell, it turns out, easily could have betrayed Pazzi in this
particular situation (the art thief, it turns out, is his lover) but Fell decides
ultimately by flipping a coin not to betray Pazzi.28 Here Inspector Pazzi trusts
competently and successfully, but that he trusts successfully isn’t because of
the competence he has, it’s because Dr. Fell’s coin landed the way it did.
25 A point of clarification. There can of course be some risk as well as some gains for betrayal present in
ordinary contexts of trusting, such that unreliability even in the presence of such risks (and gains for
betrayal) would count against competence. The claim is that abnormal levels of both risk and gains of
betrayal present conditions under which higher-than-usual failure needn’t count against one’s competence
to trust well in the kinds of conditions under which reliable trusting is valued. Thanks to an anonymous
referee for discussion on this point.
26 Compare: we don’t test for the competence to play poker in conditions under which buy-in and cash-
out structures are dramatically altered.
27 Correlatively, a complete trust competence is exercised only when one trusts while in proper shape and
properly situated, as circumscribed.
28 For those who take issue with the possibility of voluntary belief, the coin-flip can be changed, with no
loss, to an involuntary but superstitiously grounded belief.
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The above case is, no doubt, a case of lucky trust,29 one where the luck in play taints
our assessment of Pazzi’s trusting successfully. But the luck does not resemble (in
epistemology) a completely wild guess30 or (in an athletic performance) a shot
performed blindly, and this is because the truster here exercises a competence to
trust well. We have, to put it simply, a kind of ‘justified, successful trust’ where the
source the justification (or—more generally—what accounts for why the trusting is
competent) has very little to do with why the trusting is successful.31
What this all suggests is that even when one trusts in a way that manifests
competence and also trusts successfully, something still might fall short. One’s
trusting successfully might still not manifest one’s competence to trust well.32
On Sosa’s performance normativity model, when a performance’s success issues
(non-deviantly33) from a complete competence, the performance is not only
successful, and competent, but apt.34 This points to there being something better
than trusting (merely) successfully and competently: trusting aptly, where one’s
trusting successfully manifests one’s complete Trust-C competence—something
Inspector Pazzi clearly lacked.
Apt trust: S trusts aptly if, and only if, S’s successful Trust-A’ing manifests S’s
complete Trust-C competence.
29 The luck at play here is analogous to what Pritchard (2005, 146–149) calls ‘veritic luck’—viz., as
when it is a matter of luck, given the way the success was attempted, that it was successful. Cf., Engel
(1992). Note that Sosa (2010, 467) himself thinks that ‘the Gettier phenomenon thus generalizes beyond
the case of belief… A performance of whatever sort is Gettiered if it is both accurate and adroit without
being apt’. These are just the structural features that are in place in the above case.
30 Guessing (unlike ordinary beliefs) involves affirmation in a way that takes a chance on gaining truth
with little to no weight given to risk of error. For further discussion of such cases—viz., where one
guesses in an eye exam—see (along with §11) Sosa (2015, 74–75). Cf., Carter (2016).
31 This kind of luck is what Pritchard (2009, Chs. 2–3) calls intervening luck—where luck intervenes
between the subject and the success. This is distinct from environmental luck, where the unsafety of the
success is down to the subject’s being in a bad environment (one where error possibilities are modally
close). For further discussion, see Pritchard and Whittington 2015). Note that the intervening/
environmental distinction is a distinction that falls within the wider class of veritic (i.e., malignant) luck.
See fn. 29.
32 I take the above to be a performative analogue, in the case of trusting, to an example that is often used
to illustrate ‘Gettiered’ performances—viz., Sosa’s ‘double-gust-of-wind’ case. In this case, suppose a
shot is released skilfully, deflected by a fluke gust of wind, and then (at the last moment) brought back
toward the target by a fortuitous second gust of wind. In such a case, the shot is successful, and although it
is competent, it is not successful because competent. See Sosa (2009, 22; 2010, 465–467 and 2017,
72–73) for discussion.
33 For discussion of finks, mimics and masks as they interface with competences, see Sosa (2015, 96, fn.
3 and 145).
34 Elsewhere, in the emotions literature, ‘apt’ may have other senses—viz., fittingness. All uses of ‘apt’
and ‘aptness’ refer to the technical sense described here, of successful because competent.
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8.
Is apt trust then the best kind of trust we should aspire to? Recall here the
axiological analogy with belief: belief that hits its aim (truth) because of ability—
viz., knowledge, according to (robust) forms of virtue epistemology35—is an
achievement, more valuable than true belief otherwise attained.
Apt trust, likewise, is an achievement—a success through ability. But even so,
apt trust may be fragile in the following respect: (i) one trusts aptly when one’s
successful Trust-A’ing manifests one’s complete Trust-C competence; (ii) that one
manifests a complete Trust-C competence requires that one in fact be in proper
shape and properly situated; (iii) one, properly constituted and situated, might
nonetheless very easily trust when not in these conditions, where doing so would not
reliably lead to successful trust.
Consider now the following case:
Mr. X: Mr. X, having read The Art of the Deal along with several books by
Tony Robbins, fancies himself a charismatic dealmaker, overestimating his
influence. Mr. X entrusts Mrs. Y with information I, in a situation within
normal bounds of risk, effort and skill, and Mrs. Y does not betray Mr. X.
Mr. X’s trust-A on this occasion may be apt—his successful trust manifests
his competence to trust reliably enough in normal conditions. However,
suppose that while Mr. X in trusting Mrs. Y has trusted aptly, he very easily
would have trusted inaptly in those conditions. Although in entrusting Mrs. Y
with information I, the risk to Mr. X is in fact not excessively high and gains
of betrayal are within normal bounds, Mr. X. (with a distorted view of his
charisma and influence, thanks to the Tony Robbins books) would easily have
entrusted Mrs. Y with information I outside such bounds (e.g., had I been
information that would have given Mrs. Y huge gains if divulged with little
threat of her detection), in a situation where he would not have been a reliable
enough truster.
In the above case, Mr. X’s trusting is apt, though very easily would he have trusted
inaptly, outside of his range of sufficient reliability, given the distorted view he has
of his competence to trust, a distorted view which precludes him from accurately
gauging the risks of trusting inaptly that are present. That Mr. X trusted aptly on this
occasion as opposed to inaptly doesn’t owe to any awareness of his of the threshold
of his own competence to trust reliably (an awareness he lacks ex hypothesi), but
rather just to good fortune.
9.
What, exactly, is ‘missing’ in the case of Mr. X? How would this best be
articulated? Here it will be helpful to introduce what Sosa calls full aptness, as this
applies to performances more generally:
35 E.g., Greco (2003, 2010), Turri (2011) and Zagzebski (1996).
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The fully desirable status36 for performances in general is full aptness: it is
aptness on the first order guided by apt awareness on the second order that the
first order performance would be apt (likely enough).37
In order to unpack this idea, compare Mr. X with a basketball player who shoots
aptly within his threshold of sufficient reliability, but unaware of where that
threshold lies, very easily would have shot from outside it. In such a case, the shot is
apt—viz., it issues from the shooter’s complete competence—despite the shooter
lacking a second-order ability to competently gauge the risk of inaptness, something
that requires (among other things) a competent view of the shooter’s own
competence.
The basketball player, then—like Mr. X.— performs aptly, but not fully aptly.
There is, though, a more incisive way of putting Mr. X’s situation, one that
distinguishes between two aims one has in trusting.
Consider, as Sosa (2015) says of the basketball player, that he:
… aims not just to succeed no matter how aptly [sic. but] to succeed aptly
enough (through competence), while avoiding too much risk of failure. Their
shots are assessed negatively when they take too much risk (2015, 85).
On the one hand, the truster (like the basketball shooter) aims not merely at success,
a first-order aim, but also at apt success, a second-order aim.
Domain
of
endeavour
First-order aim Second-order aim
Basketball Make basket (i.e., successful
shot)
That one’s successful shot
manifests one’s complete
shooting competence (i.e., apt
shot)
Trust That one’s Trust-A in another is
fulfilled, viz., when another has
taken care of things as we have
entrusted them (i.e., successful
trust)
That one’s successful Trust-
A’ing manifests one’s
complete Trust-C competence
(i.e., apt trust)
With respect to the first-order aim of trusting successfully, there is the matter of
whether that is aptly attained (i.e., whether one’s trusting successfully manifests a
complete Trust-C competence). But it is a distinct question whether the further aim
of trusting aptly is itself attained aptly. If so, this will not just be a matter of one’s
successful trusting manifesting a Trust-C competence—viz., a competence to trust-
A successfully reliably enough when in proper shape and situation; aptly hitting the
aim of trusting aptly requires also manifesting a second-order or reflective
36 See, however, Kelp et al. (2017, Sect. 5) for a recent criticism of Sosa’s view that performances attain
fully desirable status if, and only if, they are fully apt.
37 Sosa (2015, 85).
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competence—call this meta-Trust-C—a competence to trust not just successfully,
but aptly, reliably enough. Unlike the first-order Trust-C competence, a meta-Trust-
C competence will be a kind of second-order ‘monitoring’ competence,38 one by
which the truster reliably judges risk of inaptness, as opposed to merely trusting
reliably enough when in proper shape and properly situated (viz., within normal
bounds of risk, effort and skill).
With reference to the foregoing, we can now capture a richer level of trust—call
it convictive trust—as follows39:
Convictive trust (i.e., fully apt trust): A subject S’s trust is convictive if and
only if S’s successful Trust-A’ing (i) manifests one’s complete Trust-C
competence (i.e., is apt); and (ii) is guided to aptness by the truster’s (second-
order) assessment of risk through meta-Trust-C.
A notion that needs unpacking, of course, is that of guidance as it features in the
above account of convictive trust. Guidance is needed to close a certain gap that
might otherwise be present between (i) one’s apt trusting; and (ii) one’s apt (second-
order) assessment of risk of trusting inaptly. Consider the following:
Sherlock: Sherlock trusts Mrs. Hudson to complete an important task, the trust
is successful (she takes care of what he entrusted her to do as he entrusted her
to do it), and the trust is apt: his trusting successfully manifested a complete
Trust-C competence. Suppose further that his trusting was aptly risk assessed;
Sherlock aptly appreciates that not easily would he trust inaptly in these
conditions. But because life has gotten a bit too boring, Sherlock decides
whether to actually trust by flipping a coin, and so his apt risk-assessment in
this case is in fact disconnected from his apt trusting.40
What separates convictive trust, trust that is fully apt, from trust like Sherlock’s,
which is merely apt and aptly assessed for risk of inaptness—is that it is not merely
apt ‘in the light of’ an apt risk assessment (through a competent view of the
subject’s own competence), but also guided by that assessment—viz., where the
trusting itself is because of, and not merely compresent with, the second-order risk
assessment.
10.
Fully apt trusting, despite its being apt on two levels, depends—like any kind of
human performance—on a certain kind of background. The most capable poker
player, for instance, seems as though she could play her hand fully aptly—apt on
38 For an early presentation of the features (including coherence) of the kinds of information monitored
by reflective competence more generally, see Sosa (1997).
39 I am of course using terminology that is analogous to Sosa’s animal/reflective knowledge distinction,
which focuses on belief as a performance-type with an aim. For the initial presentation of the animal/
reflective distinction, see Sosa (1991). See also Sosa (2009) and (2011).
40 Compare with Sosa’s case of Diana the huntress in Sosa (2015, 69).
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both levels—even if the electricity grid responsible for the ambient lighting very
easily could have gone out, ruining the hand, when it luckily happened to work
normally, and when the poker player simply took for granted that it would work
properly.
This raises an important question for our account of trust: what kinds of things
can a truster non-negligently ignore—and simply assume to be in place—when
exhibiting convictive (i.e., fully apt) trust?
This is a complicated issue, and I believe it is best approached via a performative
analogy from Sosa’s Judgment and Agency. Here’s Sosa:
The athlete needs to consider various shape and situation factors: how tired he
is, for example, how far from the target, and so on, for the many shape and
situation factors that can affect performance. But there are many factors that
he need not heed. It is no concern of an athlete as such whether an earthquake
might hit, or a flash tornado, or a hydrogen bomb set off by a maniac leader of
a rogue state, and so on. As an athlete, he is not negligent for ignoring such
factors (2017, 191, my italics).
There is, plausibly, a distinction within the class of factors that could cause a given
performance to fail, between
(i) the kinds of things a fully apt performer must heed in order to safeguard
against credit-reducing luck; and
(ii) the kinds of things he or she is free to non-negligently assume are already in
place.
Sosa refers to the kinds of things in category (ii) background conditions.41
Cobbling together from his various descriptions of them,42 we can identify five key
features of background conditions: logical, functional, modal, epistemological and
normative.
Logical Background conditions are entailed by the presence of pertinent seat,
shape and situation conditions; they must hold if the relevant ‘S’ [seat/shape/
situation] is in place at the time of the performance.43
41 It may be helpful here to register some parallels between what Sosa calls background conditions with
what Dancy (2000, 127–130) calls enabling conditions, as they feature in account of acting for a reason.
Being born, for instance, is an an enabling condition for my (say), doing something /-ing for a reason at a
later time in the sense that it is a necessary precondition for my doing so, even though it is not a reason
for my /-ing. Likewise, he thinks, believing that p is something that’s necessary for one’s /-ing because
p despite not being one’s reason for /-ing. For helpful discussion of Dancy’s and related accounts of
acting for a reason, see Marcus (2012, Ch. 2).
42 See, for example, Sosa (2017, 215–21; 2015, Ch. 3).
43 Sosa (2017, 218). This relationship may also be captured as metaphysical. As an aside, the description
‘logical’ is used here because the condition captures a kind of entailment, and because the modal
characterisation is likewise metaphysical.
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Functional Background conditions are orthogonal to a performance qua the
kind of performance it is.44
Modal Background conditions need not hold safely
Epistemological When a background condition holds, the performer need not
know that it does.
Normative The quality of a performance is not reduced or in any way effected
by reducing the safety a background condition.
The epistemological and normative features of background conditions are of
special importance, as they capture the threshold of permissible ignorance in fully
apt trusting—one may take for granted whatever, not related to the performance-
type qua performance-type—is entailed by the relevant ‘S’ [seat/shape/situation]
being place at the time of the performance.
We’ve seen what fully apt (i.e., convictive) trust demands of a truster. With
reference to the above account of background conditions, let’s now investigate what
such trust permits.
11.
Let’s use the following case as a reference point:
Loan Payment: A trusts B to pay back a (modern, online) financial debt, which
B repays as entrusted to do. Let’s assume further that all conditions for fully
apt (convictive) trust are met. So A’s trusting B on this occasion is apt—and
even more—guided to aptness by A’s assessment of risk through meta-Trust-
C.
What, exactly, are the background conditions in Loan Payment, conditions which
we may suppose that A could freely and non-negligently assume to be in place, and
which—even if they didn’t hold safely—this wouldn’t count against the quality of
A’s trusting?
As noted in the previous section, background conditions are entailed by the
presence of pertinent seat, shape and situation conditions in the sense that they must
hold if the relevant ‘S’ [seat/shape/situation] is in place at the time of the
performance. Let’s focus on what is entailed by the presence of the relevant
(a) shape and (b) situation in the case of Trust-C.
(a) Shape: Background conditions
One is in proper shape, vis-a-vis trusting, only when at least (i) mentally fit (i.e., not
physically or mentally incapacitated in a way that would have a deleterious effect on
the reliability one’s trusting) and (ii) when not coerced or manipulated ex ante intro
trusting (see §6). Implied by the relevant sort of mental fitness is the presence of
healthily functioning neurotransmitters; suppose that, had A been slipped (for
44 Consider, in particular, Sosa’s remark that it is of no concern of an athlete as such whether, e.g., a
tornado might easily have it. See Sosa (2017, 218). For related discussion, see Carter (2017).
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instance) Alpha-PVP (i.e., flakka), A’s neurotransmitters would be functioning
abnormally and would have impeded A’s ability to understand details relevant to
A’s trust exchange with B. Even if A were such that very easily A may have been
(undetectably) slipped flakka prior to the trust exchange which would have ruined
A’s shape, but by luck was not, A may (while trusting fully aptly) non-negligently
take for granted that this was not so.
A precondition of S’s not being manipulated or otherwise coerced into trusting ex
ante is that A is capable of exercising base-level autonomy with respect to whom to
trust; if (for instance) A were suddenly hypnotized, A would not be in such an
autonomous position—A’s capacity to avoid manipulation and coercion would be
undermined. Even if A very easily could have been, prior to trusting, subjected to
undetectable shape-ruining hypnosis, A may, while trusting fully aptly, non-
negligently take for granted that this was not so.
(b) Situation: Background conditions
More complex and perhaps also interesting, ethically and epistemologically, are
the background conditions that underlie the situational component of the Trust-C
competence: normal bounds of skill/risk/effort (see §6). Let’s take each in turn.
Skill. Thanks to working online banking services, replaying a complex modern
loan as entrusted doesn’t require the trustee have specialised knowledge, e.g., of
partial differential equations, stochastic calculus, etc., that are beyond normal
intellectual capacities45; doing so requires performing a sequence of simple online
steps within what is usually an intuitive choice architecture design; were online
banking services to suddenly fail (and experts to charge exorbitant fees), the trustee
could successfully (and with suitable accuracy) pay back and properly document the
complex loan only through possessing abnormally high financial and mathematical
skill. Even if world online banking systems easily could have crashed beyond A’s
ken but did not, A may, while trusting fully aptly, non-negligently take for granted
that this was not so.
Risk Thanks to a well-functioning stock market and currency system, A would
not be abnormally exposed if the debt were not paid back; if the market suddenly
crashed, A would be so exposed (and likewise, suppose, B would stand to gain
significantly more through betrayal than B does with the stock market failing to
surprisingly crash). Even if, beyond A’s ken, a cabal of oligarchs easily could have,
but just so happened to not, sabotage the stock market and world currency values in
a way that would have left B standing to gain much more by betrayal than
otherwise, A may, while trusting fully aptly, non-negligently take for granted that
this was not so.
45 I am not suggesting here that such mathematics falls outside of what normal, healthy cognitive
functioning is fit for. Such mathematical skill, even if within the reach of normal human cognition when
suitably applied, is specialised; it reflects expertise and is the product of training the lack of which is both
normal in the sense of widespread in typical communities, and which would (in the circumstance
described) render repaying the debt considerably more difficult and thus unlikely.
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Effort On the supposition that A is easily locatable by B through normal means, it
is does not take much effort for the trustee to repay the debt to the truster; if A’s
identity had been stolen, even a mathematically skilled and well-intended trustee
would have to expend considerable effort to repay A rather than A’s identity thief.
Even if, beyond A’s ken, a group of hackers might easily have, but did not, steal A’s
identity in a way that would have required enormous effort by B to locate A to repay
the loan, A may, while trusting fully aptly, non-negligently take for granted that this
was not so.46
In sum, the fully apt truster can non-negligently take for granted background
conditions that are implied by the obtaining of the relevant seat, shape and situation
constituents of Trust-C. Even if the background conditions themselves hold unsafely
beyond the subject’s ken, this is compatible with the subject trusting fully aptly.
Incompatible with trusting fully aptly is trusting even when shape and situation
conditions could easily not hold (but for reasons that are not down to the unsafety of
background conditions)—viz., as in the case of Mr. X, but not in the case of Loan
Payment.
12.
If the foregoing view is right, then a bi-level approach is needed to distinguish
between two species of trust, each of which is of human interest, and each of which
is structured differently with respect to competence and risk.
In this section, I want to outline some additional benefits that such a view offers
over more traditional univocal accounts of trust in ethics and epistemology.
(a) Puzzles about reflection
One of the perennial problems about the nature of trust concerns the interplay
between trust, risk and reflection. As Annette Baier47 vividly expresses the idea:
Trust is a fragile plant […] which may not endure inspection of its roots, even
when they were, before inspection, quite healthy.
To make this idea—viz., that reflection on (and/or monitoring of) the trust
relationship imperils trust—more concrete, consider the following case, due to
Wanderer and Townsend (2013):
Paranoid parent. A paranoid parent […] organises a babysitter for their child,
and then proceeds to spend the evening out monitoring their babysitter’s antics
remotely, via a ‘nanny-cam’. The paranoid parent is not only a lousy date, but
46 A prerequisite for the obtaining of all situational features is that that the world exists. Had a maniac
detonated a bomb, the truster, trustee and the banks and financial systems would be obliterated and the
trustee could not repay the debt. We may suppose accordingly that even if such a maniac easily could
have done so but did not, A may trust fully aptly while taking for granted that whatever preconditions to
trusting are furnished by the existence of the world are intact. For related discussion, see Sosa (2017,
191).
47 Baier (1986, 260).
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also a lousy trustor; in performing the seemingly rational act of broadening the
evidential base relevant to her judgments of trustworthiness, she is, precisely,
failing to trust the babysitter (2013, 1).
The idea that actively reflecting on the trust relationship so as to minimise risk is
itself at tension with genuine trust has been raised in various ways in the literature
on the rationality of trust.48 As McLeod (2015, §2) states the puzzle succinctly:
Since trust inherently involves risk, any attempt to eliminate the risk through
rational reflection could eliminate the trust at the same time.
A bit more permissively, Faulkner (2018, §5) remarks that:
[…][T]oo much reflection can undermine trust.49
The principal challenge for univocal accounts of trust is to explain what trust is, i.e.,
its nature, while—at the same time—making sense of how the kind of reflection or
monitoring that would seem prima facie needed to improve the quality of trusting
would not at the same time have the consequence of destroying it.50
A pleasing feature of the bi-level account proposed is that—at least in one
important respect—the account offers a way to bypass the puzzle.51 Second-order
reflection improves the quality of trusting, and at the same time, it is compatible
with genuinely trusting. Genuine trust seems, as the puzzle goes, threatened by
monitoring of the trustee. But the principal role of reflection in the proposed account
is not reflection on, or monitoring of, whether the trustee will betray one’s trust; its
role in the account of convictive trust is one of self-regulation, where the object of
the reflection, monitoring and awareness at the second order is in the main one’s
own competence and the conditions of its exercise.
(b) Internalism and the quality of trust
However one addresses the previous puzzle, it is widely thought—in particular
among philosophers of trust sympathetic with internalist epistemology52—that one
48 As Dasgupta (2000, 51) puts it, trust must be prior to any monitoring of the trustee: ‘If I can monitor
what others have done before I choose my own action, the word’trust’ loses its potency’. Likewise,
accordingly to Baier (1986, 260): ‘Trust is a fragile plant […] which may not endure inspection of its
roots, even when they were, before inspection, quite healthy’. For a helpful overview, see Wanderer and
Townsend (2013). Cf., Mo¨llering (2006, Ch. 5) for a more radical expression of the idea that trust cannot
withstand rational scrutiny.
49 Note that, beyond philosophical considerations in favour of this constraint on trust, there are also
empirical reasons to embrace it, or something like like it. See for instance Fuchs (2010) for a discussion of
how reflection and monitoring have a deleterious effect on trust in psychopathology.
50 In the recent literature, doxastic accounts of trust, according to which trusting either is or involves the
belief that the trustee will be trustworthy, have in particular attempted to resolve this problem. See, for
instance, Hieronymi (2008, 213–36) and McMyler (2011). For discussion, see Faulkner (2018, §5).
51 To be clear, the puzzle is bypassed only in the sense that the view proposed is able (better so than other
proposals) to preserve the compatibility of trust and (trust-relevant) reflection. Whether the puzzle can be
solved—viz., presumably by showing either that one of the claims that generates it is false—is beyond
what I’m aiming to show here.
52 See, for instance, Fricker (1995), Lipton (1998), and Lehrer (2006).
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ought to have good reasons for trusting others, in particular, in cases where there are
significant stakes. A correlative of this idea is that successful trust, backed by good
reasons for trusting, is better (from the point of view where good trusting is valued)
than trust otherwise secured.
For example, Russell Hardin (2002, 12) maintains that the quality of one’s
trusting is a function of the (continually) updated reasons one has that the trustee
will be trustworthy, which might come from such things as inductive generalisations
and past experiences, etc.53 Having such an internal perspective that backs one’s
trusting is surely valuable from the perspective where trusting well is valued.
Though it cannot exhaust such value.
Here a comparison in epistemology is illustrative: why is it epistemically
valuable (i.e., from the point of view where we care about the truth) for our beliefs
be reasonable in light of one another?
Here’s Sosa (1997) in an early paper on reflective knowledge:
Coherence-seeking inferential reason, like retentive memory, is of epistemic
value when combined with externally apt faculties of perception, because
when so combined it, like retentive memory, gives us a more comprehensive
grasp of the truth than we would have in its absence (1997, 421).
If externally competent faculties are working as they should, then having broad
coherence in our beliefs is desirable in part because it is truth-conducive, and this is
so ‘even if in a demon world […] coherence fails this test’ and would not promote
true belief’ (ibid., 422).
Analogously with trust: trusting backed by a rational and internally coherent
perspective is valuable, vis-a`-vis trusting well, when externally competent faculties
(viz., Trust-C) are working as they should; in such circumstances, such coherence is
desirable because it is conducive of successful trust; and this is so even if in a world
where trust were categorically betrayed,54 such internal coherence would fail this
test.
If the foregoing is right, the value of trusting well cannot be explained as
internalists such as Hardin suggests, even if internalist considerations can (if
combined with externally competent faculties) promote successful trust. By
contrast, the bi-level account fits snugly with the above points.
In short: internal coherence is (a) an important feature of convictive trust and is
essential to one’s (second-order) ability to place one’s first-level trust in perspective;
and (b) is desirable (vis-a`-vis our aims in trusting) because in our actual world
(where our first-order trust competence really is reliable) it is conducive to
successful trust. This is not meant to suggest that such an internal perspective is
53 For helpful discussion, as well as a survey of some criticisms, see McLeod (2015, §5).
54 The viability of such a world has been contested. See, in particular Coady (1992, 85), which presents
the famous Martian Argument which casts doubt on systematically false reporting. A more general about
the untenability of systematic lying owes to Kant.
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needed for apt trust—it is not (much, anyway)55—but rather to affirm that beyond
apt trust there is a better species of trust.56
(c) Enriching trust (and trustworthiness)
A separate point worth addressing about the quality of trust is due to Jones (2012,
72), and in particular, to her remarks about rich trustworthiness. Firstly, note that in
paradigmatic cases of interpersonal trust, we trust someone with something (i.e., to
take care of some particular things, as entrusted). This is sometimes called ‘three-
place-trust’57 so as to distinguish such trusting from two-place trust, as when one
trusts another simpliciter.
While apt and convictive trust, as presented, are models of three-place-trust,58
two-place trust is also valuable. Consider Jones’ remarks on two- and three-place
trustworthiness, and why two-place trustworthiness may be of special interest.
When we talk about cultivating trustworthiness, we sometimes have three-
place trustworthiness in mind, as when, for example, we talk about ways of
fostering the trustworthiness of doctors with respect to their patients.
However, often, when we talk about cultivating trustworthiness, our target
is rich trustworthiness: we want both to increase the range of domains over
which people will be competent and responsive to dependency and to improve
those capacities required to have a reliable grasp of these zones of competence
and to be able to signal them to others (2012, 72).
By parity of reasoning, in the case of cultivating the capacity to trust well, our target
is an analogous one—viz., we value increasing (i) the range of domains over which
people will trust competently; but in addition to this, we also aim ‘to improve those
capacities required to have a reliable grasp of these zones of competence [sic to trust
well] and to be able to signal them to others’ (ibid., 72, my italics).
It should be emphasised that if the capacity to trust well is likewise enriched by
way of (i) and (ii), as it plausibly would, then this will require not merely the
cultivation of Trust-C, but also the cultivation of meta-Trust-C through which one
has a reliable grasp of one’s zones of (Trust-C) competence.
The bi-level account neatly explains why trust would be enriched by cultivating
both Trust-C and meta-Trust-C. The cultivation of the former is conducive to apt
55 One might initially balk at this thought; doesn’t the possession of Trust-C require internal coherence?
Not necessarily. Consider that Trust-C is a function of one’s being reliable at securing an end (successful
trust) under a range of circumstances under which securing that end is of human interest—viz., when one
is in proper shape and properly situated. The factors that make one reliable at securing successful trust
when in proper shape and properly situated may in a truster lie below the surface of conscious
endorsement.
56 These points are presented, intentionally, in a way that is analogous to the way Sosa summarises the
role of coherence in his bi-level virtue epistemology in Sosa (1997, 422).
57 See, for example, Horsburgh (1961) and Hardin (1992).
58 I am sympathetic to Hawley’s suggestion that trust is ‘primarily a three-place relation, involving two
people and a task’; this is compatible with recognising other valuable ways of trusting. See Hawley (2014,
2, my italics).
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trust, which is good. The cultivation of the latter, when apt trust is secured, is
conducive to convictive trust, which is even better.
(d) Varieties of risk assessment
We’ve already noted that trust and risk are conceptually connected59; trusting
inherently involves vulnerability to the risk that the trustee will not take care of
things as entrusted to.
However, the varieties of risk assessment that befit a good truster are not limited
to assessing this risk—that the trustee will not take care of things as entrusted—even
under a wide construal of what kinds of factors are relevant to this particular risk.
There are other risks inherent in trusting.
Following Duncan Pritchard (2015, 437) it will be helpful to distinguish between
(a) a risk event60; and (b) riskiness. A risk event (alternatively called a ‘risk’) is a
possible but unwanted or harmful outcome, whereas an event is risky (or ‘high risk’)
when the chance of the risk event materialising is higher than is normal for an
activity of the relevant kind.
Harms internal to a domain are fixed by the aims of that domain. Trusting, on the
account proposed (i.e., §9), has two aims—the first-order aim of trusting
successfully, and the second-order aim of trusting aptly. The non-obtaining of
these aims are distinct risk events. There are thus two kinds of trust-relevant
riskiness: that which features when the chance61 of the non-obtaining of the first-
order aim (successful trust) is higher than normal; and that which features when the
chance of the non-obtaining of the second-order aim (apt trust) is higher than
normal.
Risk management techniques appropriate to each aim may come apart. One may
manage first-order risk (by limiting first-order riskiness) while lacking any good
way to manage second-order risk. This is the situation we find in cases like that of
Mr. X., and more generally, in cases where a truster possesses, and exercises, Trust-
C in ways that are not fully apt. Conversely, in cases like Sherlock, one’s second-
order risk management techniques may not bear on one’s management of first-order
risk.
An advantage that the bi-level account enjoys over univocal accounts of trust is
that it can explain in a straightforward way why both varieties of trust-relevant risk
management, neither of which entails the other, should be valued and cultivated.
(e) The distinction between trust and reliance
59 See Nickel and Vaesen (2012) for further discussion.
60 As is noted by Hansson (2004), in some academic disciplines, the term ‘risk’ is used alternatively to
refer to (i) the probability of such a harm, or (ii) the expected disutility of such a harm. Hansson (2014).
61 Such chance is generally modelled in terms of probabilities. However, there may be advantages to
modelling risk modally rather than probabilistically. For some recent defences of this idea, see Pritchard
(2015, 2016).
J. A. Carter
123
What is the difference between trust and mere reliance? One familiar line adverts to
trust’s involving a dependence not only on another to take care of something, but on
another to do so compresently with certain attitudes—viz., with goodwill.
As Baier (1986) remarks, trust:
[…] seems to be reliance on their good will toward one, as distinct from their
dependable habits, or only on their dependably exhibited fear, anger, or other
motives compatible with ill will toward one, or on motives not directed on one
at all (1986, 234).
In a similar spirit, Karen Jones (1996) writes:
One can only trust things that have wills, since only things with wills can have
goodwills-although having a will is to be given a generous interpretation so as
to include, for example, firms and government bodies. Machinery can be relied
on, but only agents, natural or artificial, can be trusted (1996, 14).
Furthermore, concerning the appropriateness of our attitudes toward misplaced trust
compared to misplaced reliance, Hawley (2014) writes:
Suppose I trust you to look after a precious glass vase, yet you carelessly break
it. I may feel betrayed and angry; recriminations will be in order; I may
demand an apology. Suppose instead that I rely on a shelf to support the vase,
yet the shelf collapses, breaking the vase. I will be disappointed, perhaps
upset, but it would be inappropriate to feel betrayed by the shelf, or to demand
an apology from it (2014, 2–3).
For the present purposes, I’m disputing none of these points.62 Rather, I want to
suggest how the distinction between trust and mere reliance may in fact run deeper,
and why the bi-level account is nicely situated to account for why this is so.
Consider that the satisfaction conditions for reliance are specifiable extra-
agentially, in terms of whether someone, or something, does (or is) as one depends
on it (him, or her) to do or to be. In the case of interpersonal reliance, we might rely
on the reliably self-centred person to behave as expected; whether or not this
reliance is disappointed (as opposed to betrayed) is not a matter of what the relier
herself does, but of what the relied upon does.
The satisfaction conditions for trust, however, are importantly not (exclusively)
extra-agential, but only partly so. Just like the basketball player who chucks it from
anywhere aims, each time he chucks the ball, to make the basket, the better player
aims to shoot aptly, an aim the satisfaction conditions for which include not just
making it, but also making a well-selected shot, conditions satisfied in part by the
agent’s own contribution to the performance. Correspondingly—and this connects
with the discussion in §9—in trusting of the sort that mature humans aspire to, we
62 There is some scope to dispute them. One way to do so is to distinguish between trust that involves
mere reliance and trust that does not; Faulkner (2007, 880) makes such a move in distinguishing between
what he calls affective and predictive trust. I’m inclined to agree, though, with Hawley (2014, 4) on the
point that a ‘distinction is important because trust, not mere reliance, is a significant category for
normative assessment’.
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aim not just at avoiding being betrayed—at successful trust however we may get
it63—but we also aim at apt trust, and the satisfaction conditions for the latter
include not only the trustee’s taking care of things as entrusted, but the also the
truster’s selecting when to trust well, conditions satisfied in part by what the trusting
subject brings to the trusting.
Trust and reliance accordingly differ not only with respect to (i) the former but
not the latter depending on the goodwill of the trustee; and (ii) the appropriateness
of our attitudes toward misplaced trust in comparison with misplaced reliance; but
also with respect to (iii) the role of the trusting subject in a specification of their
respective satisfaction conditions.64
In sum, a bi-level account of trust has much to recommend it. The view has
advantages over univocal accounts of trust in matters to do with reflection, trust
quality, trust-enrichment, risk-assessment and the distinction between trust and
reliance.
A transition from a single level to a bi-level account of trust also has more
general advantages. It allows us to see more clearly what trusting well involves, how
this connects with the goals mature humans have in trusting, why these goals are
worthy ones, and why it matters how we attain them.
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disvalue of error) a wild guess (as opposed to withholding) would be advised even in the absence of
evidence. Unless under practical duress, a good thinker aims affirms with the aim of getting it right not
just any old way (but not by stab in the dark) but by a more reliable means. A similar point holds for
trusting; a good truster doesn’t trust in a way that disproportionately weights the competing aims of
(i) attaining successful trust; and (ii) avoiding distrust, so as to give all the weight to the former and none
to the latter; doing so would be trusting as the guesser guesses. For related discussion, see Carter (2017).
64 This third difference between trust and reliance may be easy to overlook given the attention to the
attitudinal features of trust that feature in debates between doxastic and non-doxastic accounts of
(univocal) trust. Within this debate, proponents of doxastic accounts as well as non-doxastic accounts
differ about whether one’s trusting another to do something involves the belief that the trustee will do that
thing. An affirmative answer is given by proponents of doxastic accounts such as Hieronymi (2008), and
McMyler (2011). A negative answer is given by proponents of non-doxastic accounts such as Faulkner
(2011) and Jones (1996). Both sides, though, seem hard pressed to account for (iii). In the former case,
this is because the satisfaction conditions for reliance on another in conjunction with a belief that the
other will do that thing, are (equally) extra-agential. Non-doxastic accounts, such as Faulkner’s and
Jones’, according to which what’s required in addition to reliance is an expectation that the trustee be
moved by the fact that S relies on the trustee to do the thing in question, likewise have extra-agential
satisfaction conditions. Whether the aim in trusting is satisfied, in either case, is just a matter of how
things go outside the scope of the agent’s own trusting.
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